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A

SUGGESTED CLASSIFICATION OF "PROVOCATION" IN
MANSLAUGHTER CASES.

"Homicide, which would otherwise be murder, is not murder,
but manslaughter, if the act by which death is caused is so done in
the heat of passion, caused by provocation,
"'
Such was the
classical definition of voluntary manslaughter. The simple verbiage
belies the difficulty encountered when application of the definition
is attempted. First, what is meant by the words "heat of passion"'?
Second, what constitutes "provocation"'' It is readily seen that heat
of passion denotes an emotional state of a man's mind while provocation obviously refers to those acts which arouse the mind to such
an emotional state. The justification of this doctrine grows out of
the realization of the law that human frailty is such that when man
is sufficiently aroused by heat of passion his ability to control the
exercise of his reason is greatly diminished.
Provocation must consist of acts of a particular kind. Words
alone are not sufficient.' In order to reduce a homicide from murder
to manslaughter the provocation must be of such a character as
naturally would be calculated to excite and arouse, and it must appear that the party acted under the smart of his sudden passion and
resentment' which must be present when the killing occurs.'
Although the law does not set a definite time following the provocation
and say that after this time the offense is murder, it does require
that the fatal blow be struck before a reasonable man's passion
would have subsided ' as the test is objective.' However, if the defendant's passion had actually cooled or never was aroused, the test
becomes subjective in his case, and he is guilty of murder8
While courts generally refer to an assault as being a sufficient
basis for giving an instruction on provocation" an examination of the
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But see Commonwealth v Hourigan, 89 Ky 305, 12 S.W 550 (1889).
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'Ballard v Commonwealth, 156 Va. 980, 15 S.E. 222 (1931).
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However
Perkins, The Law of Homicide (1946) 36 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAV
AND CRIMINOLOGY 391, 414, weakly contends that an assault is sufficient provocation basing his argument on Beasley v State, 64 Miss.
518, 8 So. 234 (1886) and Swain v. State, 151 Ga. 375, 107 S.E. 40
(1921). Neither is based upon assault alone, while in Ford v State,
40 Tex. Cr. R. 280, 50 S.W 350 (1899) the problem is squarely faced
and the court concludes that an assault alone is not sufficient.
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cases reveals that what is actually required is a battery Although
it is difficult to define the nature of the offense required, it is uni0
versally held that the bAttery must not be trivial"
and the killing
must be unaccompanied by malice." The general rule appears to be
that where there is physical violence accompanied by pain and
bloodshed, sufficient provocation exists to reduce the homicide to
manslaughter."
Analogous to the battery cases are those involving injury to
relatives of close kin. Though the exact connotation to be placed
upon the phrase "close kin" is not certain, a personal injury inflicted
on one's mother, 3 wife,'" brother or son'" may be sufficient.
The contention that mutual combat lies within the field of
provocation seems, by this writer, to be fallacious. These cases
theoretically arise when both participants suddenly fight and culminate when one party is killed. The Georgia Supreme Court in speaking of mutual combat has said that voluntary manslaughter "is of
two types,
the one being based upon passion
and the other
on the principle of mutual combat."'" The Kentucky court in rationalizing these types of cases has said that provocation is in the nature
of acts of a particular kind which are unwillingly thrust upon the
defendant, while mutual combat is in the nature of acts voluntarily
or willingly entered into. The voluntariness of the act therefore, furnishes the basis for the decision and consequently eliminates the
element of provocation."s It is readily admitted by this writer that
there may be a better rationalization of these cases, but a nonexhaustive examination of the subject has failed to disclose it. Whatever may be the rationalization, the correct conclusion, it is believed, is that in those cases where the offense is reduced from
murder to manslaughter as a result of mutual combat, a category of
manslaughter separate and distinct from that involving provocation
has been established.
Contrary to popular belief, catching one's spouse in the act of
adultery does not by the "unwritten law" justify the killing of
either or both of the parties so engaged. If one actually catches a
'126 AM. JUR. 172 (1936).
" Caldwell v State, 203 Ala. 412, 84 So. 272 (1919)
'2 Butler v State, 108 Tex. Cr. R. 643, 2 S.W 2d 254 (1928),
Webster v. State, 105 Tex. Cr. R. 600, 289 S.W 689 (1927)
"See: Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 681, 111 S.E. 90, 93
(1922)
" State v. Johnson, 6 S.W 2d 898 (Mo. 1928)
"See: Commonwealth v Russogulo, 263 Pa. 93, 106 Atl. 180
(1919) (Statement of trial judge)
"',Hickox v State, 104 Tex. Cr. R. 649, 285 S.W 621 (1926) But
see: Roebuck v. State, 113 Tex. Cr. R. 112, 18 S.W 2d 643 (1929)
'"Watson v. State, 66 Ga. App. 242, 17 S.E. 2d 559, 560 (1941)
"Hanna v. Commonwealth, 242 Ky 584, 46 S.W 2d 1098, 1100
(1932).
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spouse in the act of adultery and kills either or both of the parties
immediately there is ordinarily sufficient provocation to reduce the
offense to manslaughter.9 If, however, there was a preconceived
plan to entrap combined with an intent to kill, the offense is murder.' Likewise mere knowledge of past acts is not sufficient" nor is
it sufficient if a period of time has elapsed in which the passion of a
reasonable man would have subsided." There also are cases tending
to show that the principles above stated apply where a father' or
brother" kills one whom he detects in adultery or illicit intercourse
with his daughter or sister. It is believed that this is a reasonable
extension.
Another broad field of provocation is found in the cases mvolving illegal arrest. Stated broadly the rule seems to be that one who
resits" a known illegal" arrest is guilty of manslaughter if a killing
occurs, only in the absence of express malice." It has been so held
both where the identity of the officer is known" and where it is unknown." It may also auply to one aiding the party illegally arrested.'
It is submitted that the acts which the law recognizes as sufficient legal provocation for the reduction of an intentional homicide
to manslaughter fall into three general classes. They are:
1. Actual physical injury to the person or to a close relative.
2. Illicit intercourse being practiced by or upon one of close
kin.
3. Resistance to a known illegal arrest.3
The key to the law of provocation seems to be found in the
word "shock." In every instance where provocation is found, the law
" Crowder v State, 208 Ala. 697, 93 So. 338 (1922)
'People v Gingell, 211 Cal. 532, 296 Pac. 70 (1931)
State v.
Agnesi, 92 N.J. Law 53, 104 Atl. 299 (1919) State v Imundi, 45 R.I.
318, 121 Atl. 215 (1923)
"Garcia v People, 64 Colo. 172, 171 Pac. 754 (1918), Humphreys v State, 175 Ga. 705, 165 S.E. 733 (1932).
"Collins v State, 88 Fla. 578, 102 So. 880 (1925)
"See: Patterson v State, 134 Ga. 264, 67 S.E. 816 (1910).
" See: Teague v State, 67 Tex. Cr. R. 41, 148 S.W 1063, 1064
(1912)
"People v Gilman, 47 Cal. App. 118, 190 Pac. 205 (1920), State
v. Cates, 97 Mont. 173, 33 P 2d 578 (1934)
" See: Ex parte Sherwood, 29 Tex. App. 334, 15 S.W 812, 813
(1890).
"Giddens v State, 154 Ga. 54, 113 S.E. 386 (1922)
State v.
Kuykendall, 37 N.M. 135, 19 P 2d 744 (1933)
"People v White, 333 Ill. 512, 165 N.E. 168 (1929).
"People v Scalisi, 324 Ill. 131, 154 N.E. 715 (1926)
'Bergman v State, 160 Miss. 65, 133 So. 208 (1931)
" Dickey, Culpable Homicide in Resisting Arrest (1933)
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presumes that although the offense was intentional, the human
capability for prudent judgment has been so stupified by the acts
The
done that the reaction is in the form of a violent impulse.'
temporary shock involved while mitigating the offense does not extinguish it. The existence of the doctrine is justified only by the
fact that man is an imperfect machine and the maintenance of it
rests upon the fact that through the generations he has not shown
an inclination to become a perfect one.
HARRY B. MILLER, JR.
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